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The Legal Recognition of Medical Malpractice Tort Claims Based Upon
Theories of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life
I. INTRODUCTION
The birth of a child is often referred to as a blessed event. There are,
however, circumstances where a child's birth may give rise to a lawsuit
against a physician' for negligence.2 Such circumstances have fostered
two new theories for the recovery of damages which have been applied
recently in medical malpractice cases. The first cause of action, wrongful
birth, arises when a physician's negligence results in pregnancy and the
birth of an unwanted3 child. The second cause of action, wrongful life,
compensates for the birth of a retarded or severely deformed child,
although the child was not necessarily unwanted.
The typical wrongful birth claim is brought by the parents4 to recover
damages for medical expenses, emotional pain and suffering, and child
support.' The typical wrongful life claim6 is brought by the parents, but
1. For a listing of wrongful birth and wrongful life cases filed against persons other than physi-
cians, see infra note 12.
2. Such claims have also given rise to contract-based actions. See, e.g., Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.
Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967):
Clegg v. Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc. 2d 155,
352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957).
While there are a few advantages in pursuing recovery on a contract theory as opposed to a tort
theory, the contract-based action has a number of distinct disadvantages which appear to make the
tort theory of recovery the plaintiff's most favorable option in the majority of cases. See Robertson,
Civil Liability Arising from "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuccessful Sterilization Operation, 4
AM. J.L. & MED. 131, 145-48 (1978).
3. The term "unwanted" is used here to refer to "unplanned" children. Many parents feel
they have a moral obligation to raise as best they can a child who was unwanted at conception. In
most cases an emotional bond between parent and child develops early, even in cases where the child
was unwanted at its conception. However, it is clear that no court can say as a matter of law that
every mother seeking wrongful birth damages, wed or unwed, is required to abort or place the child
up for adoption. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971).
4. Wrongful birth claims have also been brought by older siblings of a child born as a result of
a physician's negligence. The basis of these claims is that because of the physician's negligence, the
additional child was born, consequently reducing the older sibling's share of future parental care,
love, training, and financial support. E.g., Cox, 77 Misc. 2d at 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (cause of
action not recognized).
5. Claims have also been filed for the husband's loss of consortium and the mother's lost wages
during the pregnancy. See infra note 42. For a brief discussion of a case where damages were sought
for the wrongful death of a spouse during childbirth stemming from a "wrongful conception," see
infra note 30.
6. The "wrongful life" suit should not be confused with the "dissatisfied life" suit. The "dis-
satisfied life" suit is typically brought by illegitimate children against their father to recover for harm
suffered by being born with the stigma of illegitimacy. Such claims have been uniformly rejected.
See, eg., Pinkney v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill.
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on behalf of the handicapped child, to recover for the physical and emo-
tional pain and suffering associated with the handicap.
Until recently, courts have been reluctant to recognize wrongful birth
claims and are less willing to accept those of wrongful life.7 Legalized
abortion,8 increased use of birth control, and medical advances which
improve the chances of detecting birth defects early in pregnancy9 have
increased the ability to terminate and to prevent undesired pregnancies.1°
These social changes and medical advances should lead courts, which
have previously rejected the theories of wrongful birth and wrongful life,
to reevaluate the validity of such claims.11
Part II of this Comment examines the wrongful birth claim, its sur-
rounding public policy, and the proposed assessments of damages for a
successful claim. Part III similarly examines the wrongful life claim.
This Comment concludes that while courts have been, and probably will
continue to be reluctant to recognize wrongful life claims, there pres-
ently exists a trend among courts to recognize claims of wrongful birth.
App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cerL denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Note, Compensation for the
Harmful Effects of Illegitimacy, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1966).
In addition, both wrongful birth and wrongful life claims should be distinguished from "wrongful
death" claims. Wrongful death claims are premised on a life that was terminated wrongfully whereas
the former claims center on the fact that a life has evolved wrongfully. See Park v. Chessin, 60
A.D.2d 80, 91-92, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 116 (1977)(Titone, J., dissenting).
7. The future recognition of wrongful life claims is not, however, an absolutely pessimistic
proposition. As of 1983, the highest courts in at least two states have steppped into the forefront by
recognizing wrongful life claims. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 100-121 and accom-
panying text.
8. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-66 (1973), the Court held that a woman has a federal
constitutional right to an abortion during the first trimester of her pregnancy. The Supreme Court
reasoned that such a right emanates from the penumbras of the constitutional right of privacy.
9. See Goss, Strict Liability: A 'Lady in Waiting"for Wrongful Birth Cases, 11 CAL. W.L.
REv. 136, 136 (1974).
10. One relatively new method of detecting prenatal birth defects is the amniocentesis proce-
dure which involves the insertion of a long needle into the mother's uterus to extract amniotic fluid
samples for laboratory analysis. For a description of the amniocentesis procedure, see Friedman,
Legal Implications ofAmniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 97-99 (1974); Note, Father and Mother
Know Best: Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J.
1493 (1978).
11. In Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court reeval-
uated its prior holding in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967), and although it
ultimately rejected a wrongful life claim, the court did allow a limited claim for wrongful birth to
recover damages for emotional anguish but not for childbearing costs. Regarding the issue of public
policy influence on case decisions involving these claims, the Berman court concluded:
In light of changes in the law which have occured in the [twelve] years since Gleitman was
decided, the second ground relied upon by the Gleitman majority can no longer stand in the
way of judicial recognition of a cause of action founded upon wrongful birth. The Supreme
Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade. . . clearly establishes that a woman possesses a constitutional
right to decide whether her fetus should be aborted, at least during the first trimester of preg-
nancy. Public policy now supports, rather than militates against, the proposition that she not be
impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make that decision.
80 N.J. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14.
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Despite this trend, courts should take the opportunity, when presented,
to expressly approve or disapprove of the causes of action at issue here.
II. THE CONCEPT OF WRONGFUL BIRTH
The phrase "wrongful birth" denotes a suit brought by parents to re-
cover money damages from a negligent physician,12 where that negli-
gence has proximately caused the wrongful birth of a child. Although
wrongful birth suits are of relatively recent vintage, their advocacy has
already occasioned considerable controversy. Much of this controversy
has been attributed to the highly emotional nature of the concepts,
"birth" and "life." For this reason, it is not surprising that plaintiffs'
counsel have, on occasion, chosen to address juries by using phrases such
as "wrongful pregnancy" or "wrongful conception" in place of the emo-
tionally charged phrases, "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life."13 How-
ever, use of these latter phrases serves to distinguish claims brought by
parents from claims brought by parents or guardians on behalf of their
children. The distinction is critical for at least two reasons. First, each of
the claims involves fundamentally different issues. Second, if the distinc-
tion is not made, the danger arises that the arguments used to defeat the
wrongful life claim may also be effective in defeating an otherwise valid
wrongful birth claim.
Wrongful birth claims have been filed in at least four distinguishable
fact situations. 4 Claims have been filed where a physician negligently
performed an ineffective abortion 5 or sterilization operation; 16 where a
pharmacist negligently dispensed contraceptives; 7 where a genetic coun-
selor negligently gave erroneous advice to the parents regarding the very
12. Although this Comment primarily focuses on the negligence of physicians, reported cases
have revealed a number of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims based upon the negligence of
persons other than physicians. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 260, 187 N.W.2d 511,
520 (1971) (genetic counselor gave erroneous preconception advice to the parents regarding the
higher-than-average risk of bearing a child afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease); see also, eg., Williams
v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965), rev'd, 25 A.D.2d 906, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786,
aft'd, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966) (child sued the State of New York
alleging that she had been born to a state mental institution inmate who had been raped); cf. Pinkney
v. Pinkney, 198 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (illegitimate children brought "dissatisfied life"
suit against their father).
13. See, eg., Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
14. The discussion here is limited to those cases which have been reported and does not purport
to be an exhaustive list of all possible fact situations in which a wrongful birth claim could arise.
15. E.g., Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 CaL Rptr. 652 (1976).
16. Many states now recognize a wrongful birth claim under these circumstances. E.g., Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409
(1976); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
17. E.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); French Drug Co. v.
Jones, 367 So. 2d 431 (Miss. 1978).
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high risk of bearing a child afflicted with a particular disease; 8 and
where a physician's negligence in failing to advise a mother of the in-
creased possibility of giving birth to a congenitally deformed child pre-
cluded the mother's exercise of the right to choose an abortion. 9
Wrongful birth cases can be subcategorized even further into cases in-
volving the wrongful birth of a severely handicapped child and cases in-
volving the wrongful birth of a healthly, but unwanted child.2 °
Despite the various factual contexts in which wrongful birth claims
can arise, a common theme in such claims is that "but for" the negli-
gence of a physician, a child would not have been born. Indeed, the birth
of an unplanned child, whether healthy or handicapped, is the focal point
of the parents' claim for money damages. Another thread common to
wrongful birth cases is that, with a few minor variations, the same argu-
ments have been used repeatedly to defeat the legal recognition of wrong-
ful birth claims. Some of these arguments will now be examined.
A. Public Policy Issues
Many courts have refused to recognize wrongful birth claims as a mat-
ter of policy, either on the basis of the "overriding benefits of
parenthood" theory or the "emotional bastard" theory, or both.
1. The "Overriding Benefits of Parenthood" Theory
Many courts2' have erroneously concluded that the "overriding bene-
fits of parenthood" theory is a rule of damages which exemplifies the
"benefits" rule set forth by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.22 The Re-
18. E.g., Park v. Chessin, 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), afl'd, 60 A.D.2d
80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
19. These claims have recently been recognized by a number of courts. E.g., Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (37-year-old pregnant woman
with higher risk of bearing a defective child not tested by physician); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d
846 (Tex. 1975) (physician failed to diagnose pregnant woman's contraction of German measles);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975) (physician failed to diagnose
pregnant woman's contraction of German measles); but see Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227
A.2d 689 (1967) (no claim recognized where physician failed to inform pregnant woman with Ger-
man measles of high risk of bearing a congenitally defective child). But cf Howard v. Lecher, 42
N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (no claim where parents were not advised of
the higher than average risk that they might bear a child with Tay-Sachs disease; duty owed only to
child). See also Johnson v. Yeshiva Univ., 53 A.D.2d 523, 384 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1976), afl'd, 42 N.Y.2d
818, 364 N.E.2d 1340, 396 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1977) (claim recognized by standard of reasonable care
not breached by not advising the mother about amniocentesis procedures).
20. For an overview of how the courts have treated these claims, see Comment, Pregnancy After
Sterilization: Causes of Action for Parent and Child, 12 J. FAM. L. 635 (1972-73).
21. See, e.g., Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974); Wilmington Medical Center v. Coleman, 298 A.2d 320 (Del. 1972); Coleman v. Garri-
son, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), affid, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal.
App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977).
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statement states that:
(w)hen the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff
or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the
interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred
is considered in mitigation of damages, to the extent that this is
equitable.23
The "benefits" rule could completely nullify the plaintiff-parents' wrong-
ful birth damage recovery. Where the defendant-physician's tortious
conduct has resulted in the wrongful birth of a child, the burden of hav-
ing the child is the "harm to the plaintiff." However, the conduct has
also conferred a special benefit, the birth of a child. Consequently, the
"joys of parenthood" may be a "value" to the plaintiff which could be
used by the court to reduce the damage award. Moreover, a court could
take the position that, since the benefits from the birth of a child defy
precise measurement, the value to the parents will always outweigh any
alleged economic harms as a matter of law. Aside from the foregoing
analysis it is important to remember that the "benefits" rule of the Re-
statement is a mitigation of damages rule, while the "overriding benefits
of parenthood" theory is a public policy which manifests a possible com-
plete bar to recovery. Confusion of these principles is responsible for
various errors and differing results in the courts.
In Terrell v. Garcia,24 the Texas Court of Civil Appeals rejected the
parents' wrongful birth claim and concluded that:
[T]he satisfaction, joy, and companionship which normal parents have in
rearing a child make such economic loss worthwhile. These intangible
benefits, while impossible to value in dollars and cents, are undoubtedly
the things that make life worthwhile. Who can place a price tag on a
child's smile or the parents pride in a child's achievement? Though we
may consider the economic point of view only, a child remains some se-
curity for the parents' old age. Rather than attempt to value these intan-
gible benefits, our courts have simply determined that public sentiment
recognizes that these benefits to the parents outweigh their economic loss
in rearing and educating a healthy, normal child.25
It appears that the Terrell court, like many other courts, followed public
policy reasoning for rejecting a wrongful birth claim. In effect, these
courts have found that not only is it impossible to compare economic
costs of raising a child with "intangible benefits of parenthood," but also
the result in every such comparison should be, as a matter of law, that
the latter outweighs the former.
However, the view that modem society should consider every birth of
a child a "blessed event" is unacceptable for at least two reasons. First,
23. Id.
24. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
25. Id. at 128.
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in many cases "the birth of a child may be a catastrophe not only for the
parents and the child itself, but also for previously born siblings."2 6 This
is particularly true when a handicapped child is born. Regarding the
wrongul birth of a handicapped child, some courts have held that the
parents can only recover the difference between the cost of raising the
handicapped child and the cost of raising a normal, healthy child.2 7 Sec-
ond, if the parents decided not to have another child because the eco-
nomic cost of raising a child outweighs the intangible benefits of
parenthood, it would appear to be a great miscarriage of justice to allow
a court, as a matter of law, to re-decide this issue for the parents. As was
stated by one commentator:
the fact that the parents love the child and feel responsible for its welfare
once it has been born does not mean that they would not have been gen-
erally happier without it or that its birth constitutes a "blessed event" in
every way. An inability to provide for and educate their previously born
children as they had anticipated or to maintain a higher standard of liv-
ing once contemplated may be a constant source of sorrow for which the
joy derived from the newest child compensates only inadequately.28
Nonetheless, some courts have persisted in their use of the "overriding
benefits of parenthood" theory to reject wrongful birth claims.
2. The "Emotional Bastard" Theory
Another approach that courts have used to defeat wrongful birth
claims is the "emotional bastard" theory. Under this theory, it is believed
that any award of damages to the parents might cause psychological
damage to the child when the child later learns of its parents' wrongful
birth suit.29 While this policy may appear sound at first glance, it can be
effectively mitigated since it is better for the parents to recover an award
of damages that will permit the child to be properly raised and educated,
even at the risk that the child will later learn of the parents' prior lawsuit.
By the time the child does learn of the suit, it is hoped that the child will
be mature enough to distinguish between an unplanned and an unwanted
child, especially if the parents have continuously provided the child with
a loving home environment.
B. Money Damage Assessments
Once the plaintiff has successfully established the elements of a claim
for wrongful birth, and the court has recognized the claim, the court
must then determine what element of damages is appropriate and how
26. Id. at 131 (Codena, J., dissenting).
27. See, eg., Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69
Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
28. Note, Elective Sterilization, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 415, 435 n.79 (1965).
29. Note, Damages-The Not So "Blessed Event," 46 N.C.L. REv. 948, 951-52 (1968).
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those damages should be measured. The controversial nature of the
wrongful birth action becomes apparent when considering the nature of
damages sought in the typical suit. Damages have been sought under a
variety of headings, including: the parents' emotional pain and suffering
in watching their congenitally deformed child suffer, medical expenses,
support costs, lost wages, loss of consortium, and the wrongful death of
the mother during childbirth.30 Assuming a court is willing to allow any
or all of these damages, it is readily apparent that some of these damages
will be easier to measure than will others. For example, to calculate
damages incurred in regard to medical expenses, the plaintiff need only
present a verified list of expenditures. Although slightly more difficult,
lost wages are, in most cases, relatively simple to calculate. Courts, how-
ever, have more difficulty calculating damages for the economic costs of
raising and educating the child and the parents' emotional pain and suf-
fering in watching their handicapped child suffer.
Additional problems arise in calculating support costs. Should dam-
ages be based subjectively upon the family's standard of living or should
they be calculated objectively according to the normal expenses an aver-
age family incurs in raising a child to the age of majority? The tradi-
tional tort law principle that a defendant "takes his victim as he finds
him,"31 implicitly demands an adoption of the subjective test. While an
application of the subjective test would appear to be the better view, espe-
cially in the context of ensuring justice to the plaintiff-parents, judicial
expediency and uniformity among cases would be attained most easily
using the objective test.
As a general propostion, there are at least three distinct views on the
issue of what damages are recoverable in a wrongful birth suit. The first
line of cases allows recovery only of damages related to the pregnancy
and birth but deny recovery for support costs.32 The second line of cases
allows the parents to recover all damages and expenses, including the
cost of the unsuccessful sterilization operation, the mother's lost wages,
and the economic costs of rearing the child.33 The third line of cases
allows recovery of all damages flowing from the physician's negligence
30. See generally infra notes 35-79 and accompanying text. At least one case has arisen involv-
ing a claim for the wrongful death of a spouse in which it was alleged that the plaintiff's wife became
pregnant after a negligently performed sterilization operation and subsequently died during child-
birth. The action was partially successful. See Foran v. Carangelo, 153 Conn. 356, 216 A.2d 638
(1966) (minor children's claim for damages for lost future care and affection of mother denied, but
plaintiff's claim for antemortem but not postmortem damages allowed).
31. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 291 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON].
32. Hereinafter this view shall be referred to as the "limited resulting damage" view. See infra
notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
33. This view shall be referred to hereinafter as the "full damages" view. This view appears to
be the minority view. See infra notes 42-55 and accompanying text.
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but requires the court to offset the benefits incurred.34
1. The "Limited Resulting Damages" View
To illustrate the "limited resulting damages" view, the case of Boone v.
Mullendore35 shall be examined. In Boone, the Alabama Supreme Court
was asked to determine the proper measure of damages in a suit for the
wrongful birth of a healthy, but unplanned child. In that case, the de-
fendant-physician informed the plaintiff-mother that she was sterile as a
result of surgery performed by the defendant to remove both of the plain-
tiff's fallopian tubes. Relying on this information, the plaintiff did not use
any contraceptives, subsequently became pregnant, and gave birth to a
healthy, but unplanned child. Thereafter, the plaintiff initiated a wrong-
ful birth suit to recover compensatory damages for medical expenses and
support costs. 36 In rejecting the "benefits rule"3 7 , the court held that the
plaintiffs recovery was not limited to out-of-pocket medical expenses and
concluded that once liability is established, damages recoverable by the
plaintiffs include: (1) damages for the mental and physical pain and suf-
fering sustained by the mother as a result of the pregnancy; (2) damages
for the husband's loss of comfort, companionship, services, and consor-
tium of the wife during pregnancy and immediately after the birth; and
(3) medical expenses. The court, however, refused to allow an award of
support costs because "[a]ny additional damages would tend to be ex-
tremely speculative in nature, and . . . could have a significant impact
upon the stability of the family unit and the subject child."'38 Moreover,
the court expressly limited its holding to cases involving the wrongful
birth of a healthy, but unplanned child.39
The concurring opinion in Boone urged adoption of a rule of damages
which would hold the defendant-physician fully liable for his negligence
but would allow an offset under the "benefits" rule.4 The concurrence
34. Hereinafter this view shall be referred to as the "Restatement" or the "offsetting benefits"
view. This view appears to be the majority view. See infra notes 56-67 and accompanying text.
35. 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982). A number of states have also adopted the "limited resulting
damages" view. See, eg., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 149 (1983); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628
S.W.2d 568 (1982); Mason v. Western Hosp., 499 Pa. 484, 453 A.2d 974 (1982); Coleman v. Garri-
son, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975).
36. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant-physician was negligent either in his failing to re-
move her fallopian tubes or, alternatively, in misrepresenting that he did remove them. Boone, 416
So .2d at 719.
37. The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the "benefits" rule because adoption of such a rule
would "invite speculative and ethically questionable assessments of damages that in the long run
would cause a great emotional impact on the child, its siblings, and the parents." Id. at 722. For a
discussion of the "benefits" rule, see supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
38. Boone, 416 So. 2d at 721.
39. Id. at 723.
40. Id. at 724 (Faulkner, J., concurring).
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also pointed out that the majority's refusal to allow full recovery for the
plaintiff's injuries infringed upon their constitutionally protected right to
determine the size of their family.41
2. The "Full Damages" View
In Custodio v. Bauer,42Appeals was asked to determine the proper
measure of damages in a suit for the wrongul birth of a healthy, but
unplanned child which resulted from an unsuccessful sterilization opera-
tion performed by the defendant-physician on the plaintiff-mother.43
The purpose of the sterilization operation was to prevent the birth of
additional children" which could aggravate an existing bladder and kid-
ney condition and to allow Mrs. Custodio's "nervous condition" to im-
prove.45 Subsequent to the birth of the child, the parents filed a wrongful
birth suit" to recover damages for medical expenses,47 the "great mental,
physical and nervous pain and suffering" suffered by Mrs. Custodio,48
support costs,49 punitive damages for fraud and deceit,5" and special
damages for breach of contract."1 The Custodio court not only allowed
recovery in all of the categories, but also stated in dicta that had the
mother died during childbirth, damages for the "value of her society,
comfort, care, protection and. . . support" would be recoverable in any
wrongful death action filed by either the husband or the nine surviving
children. 2 The court also approved of an award to the husband for loss
of his wife's services, loss of consortium and medical expenses had Mrs.
Custodio been crippled by childbirth to the extent that she could no
41. Id. at 725.
42. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). At least one other court has opted for the
"full damages" view. See, e.g., Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271,425 N.E.2d 968, rev'd,
95 Ill. 2d 193, 447 N.E.2d 385 (1983).
43. The specific alleged negligent act of the defendant-physician was an insufficient cutting of
Mrs. Custodio's fallopian tubes coupled with a failure to relocate the tubes anatomically so as to
avoid regeneration. Custodio, 251 Cal. App. 2d at 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
44. Prior to the birth of the child here involved, plaintiffs were the parents of nine children. Id.
at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
45. Id. at 307-08, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
46. The plaintiff-parents' wrongful birth claim alleged a total of seven separate causes of action
which included:
(1) negligent treatment in the performance of the operation; (2) negligent treatment in failing to
inform plaintiffs of the consequences of the operation; (3) negligent misrepresentation; (4) negli-
gence in failing to fully advise Mrs. Custodio of other treatment procedures; (5) recovery of
damages for the husband based upon the four aforementioned negligent acts; (6) fraud and
deceit; and, (7) breach of contract.
Id. at 308, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
47. Plaintiffs sought $1500 for pre- and post-natal care and hospitalization costs. Id. at 308, 59
Cal. Rptr. at 467.
48. Plaintiffs sought a total of $250,000 on this claim. Id. at 309, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
49. Here, plaintiffs sought a total of $50,000. Id.
50. Plaintiffs sought a total of $500,000 on this claim. Id.
51. Plaintiffs sought a total of $51,500 here. Id.
52. Id. at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
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longer perform her marital duties.53 Regarding the tort causes of ac-
tion,54 the court concluded: "For the breach of an obligation not arising
from contract, the measure of damages, except where otherwise expressly
provided by [the California Civil Code], is the amount which will com-
pensate for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it
could have been anticipated or not.""5
3. The Restatement or "Offsetting Benefits" View
To illustrate how the Restatement (Second) of Torts5 6 has been applied
in the context of wrongful birth claims, we shall examine Ochs v. Bor-
relli.57 In Ochs, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in a case of first
impression, was asked to determine the proper measure of damages in a
"wrongful conception" suit5" involving the birth of a child with orthope-
dic defects. 9 The first count of the parents' complaint sought damages
for medical expenses incurred directly from the unsuccessful sterilization
operation and for the pain and suffering occassioned by the operation.'
The second count of the complaint sought damages for the medical ex-
penses incurred as a result of the infant's orthopedic therapy and for the
cost of raising the infant to majority. 1
On appeal, the defendant-physicians conceded that they were negligent
in their performance of a sterilization operation on Mrs. Ochs, 62 but ar-
gued that damages should be limited to orthopedic treatment costs and
53. Id.
54. This cause is distinguished here from the cause of action for breach of contract.
55. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 325, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477 (citations omitted). As to the contract cause
of action, the court concluded that:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, except where
otherwise expressly provided by (the California Civil Code), is the amount which will compen-
sate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or which, in the
ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.
Id. (citations omitted).
56. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 920 (1977).
57. 187 Conn. 253, 445 A.2d 883 (1982). A number of other courts have adopted this view.
See, eg., Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App
3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
58. For our purposes, "wrongful conception" is the same as "wrongful birth". Many plaintiffs'
lawyers opt to use the terms "wrongful conception" or "wrongful pregnancy" in place of the more
emotionally charged term "wrongful birth" for purposes of not detrimentally arousing jurors. See
Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757, 761 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974).
59. The Ochs' infant was born with two orthopedic problems known as forefoot metatarsus
adductus and flatfoot. The forefoot adductus was corrected by casts and therapy at a cost of $230.
The only remaining treatment required was the use of an arch support in her shoes. The flatfoot
condition and a mild knock-knee still existed. 187 Conn. at 255, 445 A.2d at 884.
60. The jury awarded the plaintiff-parents $49,985 in damages on this count. Id.
61. The jury awarded the plaintiff-parents damages in the amount of $56,375 on this count. Id.
62. The sterilization procedure performed on Mrs. Ochs is known as a laparoscopic tubal liga-
tion. Mrs. Ochs consented to the procedure because she had already given birth to two children with
orthopedic defects, and she had a gynecological history of miscarriage and ovarian surgery. Id. at
254-55, 445 A.2d at 883.
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exclusive of childrearing expenses since, as a matter of public policy, "the
birth of a child is always a blessing to its parents and ... this benefit
must, as a matter of law, totally offset concomitant financial burdens."63
In rejecting the physicians' argument, and upholding the jury award on
both counts of the complaint, the court stated that "public policy cannot
support an exception to tort liability when the impact of such an excep-
tion would impair the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.""
The court went on to explain that a better rule would allow recovery of
the costs of rearing the child until it reaches majority,65 but would offset
under the "benefit" rule that amount determined by the jury which re-
flects the value of the benefits conferred upon the parents by the child.6
The court concluded that although this case-by-case "balancing test"
would require a jury to mitigate economic damages by weighing them
against non-economic factors, this weighing process is not "im-
permissably speculative."67
4. The Indescript Views
Cases remain that do not fit neatly into any of the aformentioned cate-
gories. For example, in Berman v. Allan68 the New Jersey Supreme
Court was asked to reassess the legal validity of their prior holding in
Gleitman v. Cosgrove 9 which had rejected, inter alia, the plaintiff-par-
ents' wrongful birth claim against a negligent physician.70 In Berman,
the plaintiff-parents alleged that the defendant-physician negligently
failed to inform Mrs. Berman during her pregnancy of the existence of
amniocentesis procedures which could detect prenatal birth defects.7"
Due to Mrs. Berman being thirty-eight years of age at the time of her
pregnancy, the plaintiffs alleged that there was a high probability that
Mrs. Berman could give birth to a child afflicted with Down's Syndrome.
Therefore, had the physician so informed the Bermans, Mrs. Berman al-
63. Id. at 256, 445 A.2d at 884.
64. Id. at 258, 445 A.2d at 885.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 259-60, 445 A.2d at 886.
67. Id.
68. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
69. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
70. Id. In Gleitman, the parents of a congenitally defective child sued a physician who negli-
gently failed to inform the parents of the effects on the unborn fetus of the plaintiff-mother's contrac-
tion of German measles during her pregnancy. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-physician's
negligence precluded the mother's exercise of her constitutional right to an abortion. In rejecting the
infant's wrongful life claim the court concluded that the claim was not actionable since the infant
suffered no legally cognizable damages by being born, even if born in a severely handicapped condi-
tion. In rejecting the parents' wrongful birth claim the court concluded that the intangible, un-
measurable, and complex benefits of parenthood far outweigh any alleged emotional or economic
harm. In addition the court based its conclusion on the inalienable right to life and the public policy
view that supports the preciousness of human life. Id.
71. For information concerning amniocentesis procedure, see Friedman, supra note 10.
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leged that she would have undergone the amniocentesis procedure, dis-
covered that the child had Down's Syndrome, and, conseqently,
undergone an abortion. 2
Mrs. Berman indeed gave birth to a child with Down's Syndrome.
The plaintiff-parents sued to recover damages for, inter alia, the emo-
tional pain and suffering in watching their child suffer, medical expenses,
and support costs. 73 The New Jersey court held that the parents could
recover damages for the emotional anguish associated with watching
their child suffer but rejected the claim for medical expenses, and chil-
drearing and support costs. The Berman court concluded that:
[a]lthough these costs were caused by defendants' negligence in the sense
that but for the failure to inform, the child would not have come into
existence, we conclude that this item of damage should not be recover-
able. In essence, Mr. and Mrs Berman's desire to retain all the benefits
inherent in the birth of the child-i.e., the love and joy they will experi-
ence as parents - while saddling defendants with the enormous expenses
attendant upon her rearing. Under the facts and circumstances here al-
leged, we find that such an award would be wholly disproportionate to
the culpability involved, and that allowance of such a recovery would
both constitute a windfall to the parents and place too unreasonable a
financial burden upon physicians.74
The Berman court, in essence, followed the reasoning of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in the case of Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. 75 However,
this reasoning is unacceptable for at least two reasons. As was stated
earlier, it is inapropriate for a court to assume that the birth of a child
will be beneficial to the parents in every case.76 Indeed, especially in the
Berman case, the court's assumption of a "benefit" to Mr. and Mrs.
Berman upon the birth of a child with Down's Syndrome is untenable.
Second, the Berman court's refusal to at least award damages for the
difference between the costs of rearing a handicapped child as opposed to
a healthy child is tantamount to granting partial immunity to a negligent
72. Berman, 80 N.J. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
73. Id.
74. 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
75. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974). In Rieck, the court denied the plaintiff-parent's
claim for childrearing and support costs by stating that:
Even where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on
grounds of public policy because: (1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the
injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in
retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about
the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden (in the
case before us, upon physicians and obstetricians); or (5) because allowance of recovery would
be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a
field that has no sensible or just stopping point.
Id. at 517-18, 219 N.W.2d at 244.
76. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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physician at the expense of the relatively innocent plaintiff-parents.77
By allowing an award of damages for the emotional anguish of watch-
ing their handicapped child suffer, while disallowing an award for medi-
cal expenses and support costs, it has been suggested that Berman cannot
properly be lableled as a case exemplifying any sort of trend among the
courts toward eventual full recoveries in wrongful birth suits. 78 In fact, it
has been suggested that the Berman decision, and others like it, is an
example of a judicial trend which will establish staunch limitations on
damage recovery in future wrongful birth suits. 79
II. THE CONCEPT OF WRONGFUL LIFE
The term "wrongful life"8 denotes a suit brought by the parents on
behalf of their child to recover for the physical and emotional pain and
suffering associated with being handicapped. In essence, the child claims
nonexistence would have been preferable to living a handicapped life;
therefore, he should be awarded money damages to compensate for hav-
ing to live that life. In most cases a suit by the parents for wrongful birth
will be accompanied by a claim on behalf of the child for wrongful life.
Although wrongful life claims, like wrongful birth, are a relatively recent
legal development, wrongful life claims are considered by many to be
more controversial than those of wrongful birth.
Prior to 1980, every state in the United States with the opportunity to
decide the legal validity of wrongful life claims had refused to recognize
such claims. In 1980 the California Court of Appeals, in Curlender v.
Bio-Science Laboratories81 became the first appellate court in the nation
to recognize a wrongful life claim. Two years later, in Turpin v. Sortini,82
the California Supreme Court became the first state high court in the
United States to recognize a wrongful life claim. In 1983, in Harbeson v.
77. At least two courts have adopted the view that in cases involving the wrongful birth of a
defective child, the plaintiff-parents can properly recover the difference between the cost of rearing a
defective child and the cost of raising a healthy child. See Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
78. See Comment, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life. Berman v. Allen, 8 HoFsTRA L. REv.
257 (1979).
79. Id.
80. "Wrongful life," "dissatisfied life," "wrongful death," and "wrongful birth" suits should
each be distinguished from the other. Each rests its claim for damages upon distinguishable factual
premises.
81. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). In Curlender, a child born with Tay-Sachs
disease was allowed full compensatory and punitive damages against the defendant-genetic testing
laboratory who negligently failed to give accurate information to the parents concerning their status
as carriers of Tay-Sachs disease. Id.
82. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982). For a discussion of the decision in
Turpin, see infra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
286
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Parke-Davis, Inc.," the Washington Supreme Court became the second
state supreme court to recognize a wrongful life claim.
A. Public Policy Issues
The majority of courts has advanced at least three arguments to defeat
and routinely reject claims of wrongful life.84 It has been argued that a
defendant-physician could not possibly owe a legal duty to the child-
plaintiff since the child was not a legal being when the physician's alleged
negligent act occurred. It also has been argued that the subject child did
not suffer any legally cognizable damages that a court can measure prac-
tically since it is illogical for an individual to claim that he should not be
alive and because public policy has always favored life over nonexistence.
Lastly, it has been argued that recognition of such claims would result in
undesirable consequences, such as a flood of spurious and collusive suits
by infants against their parents, and that such recognition would place an
intolerable burden upon physicians.
1. Duty
To prevail in a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff must establish,
by the "greater weight of the evidence," the existence of at least four
essential elements: (1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, pru-
dence and diligence as other members of his profession commonly pos-
sess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal
connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and
(4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional's breach of
duty." The existence of a duty in a given case is a question of law and
will depend upon how far the court is willing to extend liability. The
primary problem with wrongful life claims, however, is that courts gener-
ally refuse to recognize that the defendant could owe a duty to someone
who was not a "legal being" at the time of the defendant's negligent act.
However, some courts recently have concluded that a child-plaintiff can
recover damages for physical and mental pain and suffering in a wrongful
life suit.86 The continued reluctance of the majority of courts to recog-
nize wrongful life claims is unacceptable in this context if such reluctance
is based only upon the lack of judicial precedent.
83. 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). For a discussion of the decision in Harbeson, see
infra notes 111-121 and accompanying text.
84. Actually there are at least five separate reasons in all that have been advanced by the courts.
Only three of these can be properly categorized as "public policy" reasons and analyzed here.
85. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. App. 3d at 229-30, 643 P.2d at 960, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 343 (citing
Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 491 P.2d 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971)).
86. See, eg., Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980); Kenslow v. Menmonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); Park v. Chessin, 88
Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup Ct. 1976), afid, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977).
14
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1985], Art. 5
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss2/5
NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
2. No Legally Cognizable Harm
As part of his prima facie case, the child-plaintiff must show that he
suffered harm which was proximately caused by the defendant-physi-
cian's conduct. In the typical wrongful life suit, the child-plaintiff does
not allege that the defendant-physician in any way caused the defects
with which the child is afflicted. Rather, it is alleged that because of the
physician's negligence, the child was born and, hence, "harmed" since
the "utter void of non-existence" is preferable to living life as a severely
handicapped person.
In Berman v. Allan, 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately re-
jected a wrongful life claim for a child with Down's Syndrome. At one
point the court commented that "[o]ne of the most deeply held beliefs of
our society is that life-whether experienced with or without major phys-
ical handicap-is more precious than non-life." 8  The Berman court
went on to examine the federal and New Jersey Constitutions which were
found to be "replete with references to the sanctity of life without any
indication in these documents that impaired life was any less valuable." 9
The court also found that the most severe criminal sanctions are imposed
upon defendants who have deprived others of life.9" Lastly, the court
took note of the fact that society holds physicians in high esteem because
they are the preservers of life.9
Many courts have rejected wrongful life claims through reasoning sim-
ilar to that of the Berman court. However, recent "right to life" deci-
sions, such as In re Quinlan,9" illustrate that under certain circumstances
public policy may dictate that non-life is preferable to life. Indeed, it is
87. 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1974).
88. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12. A similar result had been reached by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967) not more than seven years before
Bernan. In rejecting the handicapped infant's wrongful life claim, the Gleitman court maintained
that the right to life is inalienable in our society and that history is replete with examples of men who
have attained great achievements and led meaningful and worthwhile lives despite their physical
handicaps. 49 N.J. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693.
89. 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12-13.
90. Id. at 429, 404 A.2d at 13.
91. Id. at 430, 404 A.2d at 13.
92. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976). In In re Quinlin the plaintiff-father sought court authori-
zation for the termination of all artificial life support apparatus and procedures for sustaining his 22-
year-old comatose daughter's life processes. The daughter was in a noncognitive, vegetative state
and the attending physicians concluded that there was no reasonable possibility of the victim's ever
emerging from her comatose condition. The court found that the constitutional right to privacy is
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circum-
stances. On the issue of the preference of death over life under certain circumstances, the court
stated:
We have no doubt, in these unhappy circumstances, that if Karen were herself miraculously
lucid for an interval (not altering the existing prognosis of the condition to which she would
soon return) and perceptive of her irreversible condition she could effectively decide upon dis-
continuing the life-support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death.
Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
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now permissible for a competent person to choose to refuse life-prolong-
ing treatment, absent a compelling state interest.93 It is difficult to see
how the courts can justify holding non-life preferable to life in the "right
to die" context, but not in that of wrongful life. One could conclude here
that it is possible, though not likely, that tomorrow's courts could find
that a severely handicapped infant-plaintiff has suffered a legally cogniza-
ble "harm" by being born.9 4
Despite apparent theoretical difficulties, it is possible to formulate
workable damages standards in wrongful life suits. Recognizing that life,
even with severe birth defects, has some value, compensation could be
measured by the mental and physical pain and suffering sustained by the
infant as a result of his birth, minus the value of life with severe birth
defects. Damages computed by the jury in this fashion would compen-
sate the plaintiff for the detrimental effects of the defendant's negligence
and avoid the theoretical difficulties which have been attributed to at-
tempted money value assessments of "non life.""
3. Undesirable Consequences
It has been argued that judicial recognition of wrongful life claims will
result in a "parade of undesirable consequences," such as fraudulent
suits, suits by children against their parents, a "flood of litigation," and
the placing of an intolerable burden upon the medical profession.96
These concerns are untenable. In regard to fraudulent claims, it is feared
that parents might claim that had they been properly advised of the risk
of bearing a severely deformed child, they would have aborted the fetus
when in truth, they might never have aborted. Obviously, the trial court
is in the best position to assess the credibility of the parents' allegations.
Assessing the credibility of witnesses is indeed one of the many functions
of a trial court.97 The fear of a "flood of litigation" is an argument often
made by courts who wish to avoid decisions on difficult, controversial, or
politically- or emotionally-charged issues. A noted commentator has
suggested that the "flood of litigation objection has been demolished
many times, and it is threshing old straw to deal with [it]." 98 The final
argument-that recognition of wrongful life suits would place an intoler-
able burden upon physicians-also cannot be supported. Even if judi-
93. See In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
94. For a discussion of at least two courts that have come to this conclusion see infra notes 99-
120 and accompanying text.
95. Cf. Comment, Illegitimate Child Denied Recovery Against Father for "Wrongful Life'
Zepeda v. Zepeda, 49 IowA L. REv. 1005, 1009 (1964); Comment, Illegitimate Child Allowed Action
for "Wrongful Life" William v. State, 50 MINN. L. REV. 593, 599 (1966).
96. Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 94-95, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110, 118 (1977) (Titone, J. dissenting).
97. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52.
98. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, § 54 at 327.
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cially recognized, recovery under a wrongful life claim would be so rare
that the alleged burden on the medical profession would, be slight. As-
suming arguendo the medical profession would be somewhat burdened
by the recognition of wrongful life claims, this burden is substantially
outweighed by the burdens that might otherwise be endured by the inno-
cent child-plaintiff.
B. Money Damage Assessments
Assuming that the child-plaintiff has successfully established a recog-
nized cause of action for wrongful life, the issue then becomes one of
appropriately assessing damages. The majority of courts have routinely
rejected wrongful life claims on the ground that damages are impossible
to measure since the court would be forced to weigh the value of a handi-
capped life against the value of nonexistence. 99 However, the decisions
of two courts set the stage for the future recognition of wrongful life
cases. These decisions by the California and Washington Supreme Courts
shall now be examined.
1. Turpin v. Sortini1"
In Turpin, the parents took their first daughter, Hope, 01 to the de-
fendant-physician's office for a hearing examination. Hope was ex-
amined by the defendant-physician who was a licensed hearing and
speech defects specialist. After the examination, the defendant incor-
rectly advised Mr. and Mrs. Turpin that Hope had normal hearing abil-
ity. In reality, Hope was "stone deaf" as a result of a hereditary hearing
ailment.102 In reliance upon the defendant's erroneous diagnosis, and
before Mr. and Mrs. Turpin were able to learn Hope's true condition, the
Turpins conceived the plaintiff-infant, Joy. This second child was born
with the same hereditary hearing ailment. Subsequently, the plaintiff-
parents filed a wrongful life action a03 on behalf of the infant against the
99. See, eg., Elliot v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1976); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); Note, Toward
Rational Boundaries at Tort Liability for Injury to the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Inju-
ries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1401, 1445.
100. 31 Cal. App. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982).
101. At the time the parents brought the child to the defendant-physician's office, Hope was the
only child born to the plaintiff-parents. Id. at 223, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
102. Id.
103. The wrongful life action was the plaintiff-parent's second cause of action. Actually, the
Turpins filed a total of four causes of action. The first cause of action was brought on behalf of the
first child, Hope, to recover for damages suffered due to the defendant-physician's negligent delay in
diagnosing her hearing aliment. The third and fourth causes of action were brought by and on
behalf of the plaintiff-parents to recover special damages for Joy's medical, childrearing and support
costs and general damages for the mental anguish suffered by the parents "attendant to raising and
caring of a totally deaf child." Id. at 224, 643 P.2d at 956, 182 'Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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defendant-physician,1 4 to recover: (1) general damages for being "de-
prived of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, func-
tional human being without total deafness" and (2) special damages for
the "extraordinary expenses for specialized teaching, training and hear-
ing equipment" which she will incur during her lifetime as a result of her
hearing impairment. 05
The California Supreme Court rejected the claim for general damages
and reasoned as follows:
In requesting general damages in a wrongful life case, the plaintiff seeks
monetary compensation for the pain and suffering he or she will endure
because of his or her hereditary affliction under (the "benefits"rule of the
Restatement of Torts); however, such damages must be offset by the ben-
efits incidentally conferred by the defendant's conduct 'to the interest of
the plaintiff that was harmed.' With respect to general damages, the
harmed interest is the child's general physical, emotional and psychologi-
cal well-being, and in considering the benefit to this interest which de-
fendant's negligence has conferred, it must be recognized that as an
incident of defendant's negligence the plaintiff has in fact obtained a
physical existence with the capacity both to receive and give love and
pleasure as well as to experience pain and suffering. Because of the incal-
culable nature of both elements of this harm-benefit equation, we believe
that a reasoned, nonarbitrary award of general damage is simply not
obtainable. 0 6
The Turpin court further concluded that tort damages are generally com-
pensatory10 7 and not punitive in nature and that there was nothing the
defendants could have done which would have afforded the plaintiff-in-
fant with an unimpaired life.' 8 However, the Turpin court did allow the
plaintiff-infant's claim for special damages for the extraordinary expenses
necessary to treat the hereditary hearing ailment. 09 Regarding the issue
of special damages, the Turpin court concluded that "[w]hile the law
cannot remove the heartache or undo the harm, it can afford some rea-
sonable measure of compensation toward alleviating the financial
104. The hospital, the rehabilitation center, and "various Does" were also joined as defendants
in this action. Id.
105. The plaintiffs alleged that the nature of the hearing ailment was such that there is "a 'rea-
sonable degree of medical probability' that the hearing defect would be inherited by any offspring of
(plaintiff-parents)." The plaintiffs further alleged that but for the defendant's negligence, they would
have chosen not to conceive the second child. Id.
106. Id. at 236-37, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
107. Compensatory damages are awarded in tort not to punish but rather to help restore an
injured person to the position he or she would have been in had the wrong not been committed. Id.
at 232, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 901
Comment a (1977).
108. 31 Cal. 3d at 220, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
109. The plaintiff-infant's claim here relates only to medical expenses to be incurred by her after
the age of majority. The plaintiff-parents' claim for special damages seeks medical expenses to be
incurred by the parents during the plaintiff-infant's minority. Id. at 237 n. 11, 643 P.2d at 965 n. 11,
182 Cal. Rptr. at 348 n.l1.
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burdens."1 10
2. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc. 111
Approximately eight months after the California Supreme Court de-
cided Turpin v. Sortini,112 Washington became the second state to recog-
nize a wrongful life claim. In Harbeson, the parents of two children
suffering from "fetal hydantoin syndrome" '113 filed a wrongful life
claim.. 4 against three Army physicians. To control her epileptic
seizures, the plaintiff-mother took an anticonvulsant drug as prescribed
by an Air Force doctor.1 5 Upon relocating to another base, the plaintiff-
parents were incorrectly advised by three defendant-Army physicians
that the continued use of the drug would not cause any serious birth
defects in any future-born children. 6 In April 1974 and May 1975, the
plaintiff-mother gave birth to the plaintiff-infants, both of whom had fe-
tal hydantoin syndrome.' 17 "But for" the defendants' negligence, the
plaintiff-parents allegedly would have decided not to have any more
children. 118
In allowing the plaintiff-infants to recover for the cost of future medi-
cal care 19 attributable to their birth defects, the court concluded that "it
would be illogical and anomalous to permit only parents, and not the
child, to recover for the cost of the child's own medical care."' 2 ° The
court went on to say that because these immense medical costs could
continue after the infants reached majority, unless otherwise provided,
these expenses would fall upon the parents or the state. In order to pre-
vent this result, the court concluded that the plaintiff-infants' claim for
future medical costs should be allowed so as to "place the burden .. on
110. Id. at 239, 643 P.2d at 965, 182 Cal. Rptr at 348 (citing Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. at
49, 227 A.2d at 703) (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
111. 93 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
112. 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr 337 (1982).
113. Fetal hydantoin syndrome is characterized by mild to moderate growth deficiencies and
developmental retardation, wide-set eyes, droopy eyelids, hypoplasia of the fingers, small nails, a
broad nasal ridge, a low-set hairline and a host of other possible birth defects. Harbeson, at 463, 656
P.2d at 486.
114. The parents also filed a wrongful birth claim which was also successful. Id. at 462, 656 P.2d
at 486.
115. The doctor who originally prescribed the anticonvulsant drug is not the defendant-physi-
cian with who we are concerned in this case.
116. Each of the doctors had told the plaintiff-parents that the drug could cause cleft palate and
temporary hirsutism in the mother but none of the physicians consulted any outside sources to see if
the drug could cause birth defects in future children. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 463, 656 P.2d at
486.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Future medical expenses here refer to those medical expenses that will be incurred by the
plaintiff-infants after they have reached the age of majority. Id. at 479, 656 P.2d at 495.
120. Id.
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the party whose negligence was . . . a proximate cause of the child's
continuing need for such special medical care and training." '12 1
IV. CONCLUSION
While a number of courts have had the opportunity to address the
legal validity of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, many courts
have yet to decide these issues. Once uniformly rejected, reported cases
presently show a tendency among courts to allow some recovery under
the heading of wrongful birth, though to a limited degree. However, this
leniency should not be confused with a trend towards the eventual uni-
form recognition of wrongful birth claims. Even those courts which have
allowed recovery have been careful not to appear overzealous in their
recognition of wrongful birth claims. Still, among those courts which
have allowed such claims, there is considerable disagreement as to the
appropriate measure of damages. Many seemingly insurmountable hur-
dles also have been placed in the path leading to legal recognition of
wrongful life claims. Among these "hurdles" are: (1) the philosophical
imponderables of appearing to favor nonexistence over life; (2) the as-
serted difficulty of assessing damages; (3) the question of the existence of
a legal duty to the unborn infant; (4) the fear of a "flood of litigation";
(5) the fear of fraudulent suits; and (6) the fear of placing an intolerable
burden upon the medical profession. While a relatively small minority of
courts have chosen to recognize wrongful life claims, despite these afore-
mentioned hurdles, most courts have unequivocably rejected claims of
wrongful life.
This Comment has sought to determine whether it is beyond the prov-
ince of our courts to assess the validity of wrongful birth and wrongful
life claims. Many judges, lawyers, and legal commentators have debated
whether the responsibilty for assessing the legal validity of wrongful birth
and wrongful life claims properly rests upon the legislatures or the
United States Supreme Court, rather than upon state courts. It is inter-
esting to note that in the seventeen years or more since wrongful life and
wrongful birth claims were first introduced into our courts, neither the
United States Supreme Court nor any legislature has directly addressed
the legal validity of these claims. In this context, it might be reasonable
to infer that by their silence, the United States Supreme Court, Congress,
and state legislatures have implicitly acquiecsed in how the courts have
disposed of wrongful birth and wrongful life claims.
Wrongful birth and wrongful life claims have provided our courts with
a totally new array of interesting and complex legal issues. For the sake
of all courts, a definitive determination by the Supreme Court most likely
121. Id.
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will be a welcomed event. Meanwhile, the courts should not sidestep
their responsibility of affirmatively allowing or disallowing either a
wrongful birth or wrongful life claim, or both. Indeed it is the duty of our
courts to make precedent where a wrong requires redress.
KEVIN L. MAYO
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